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AVIATION LAW-PERSONAL INJURY-THE WARSAW CONVENTION, AS MODI-
FIED BY THE MONTREAL AGREEMENT, DOES COMPREHEND, AND THUS SUPPLIES
THE EXCLUSIVE RELIEF FOR, MENTAL AND PSYCHOSOMATIC INJURIES.
On September 6, 1970, plaintiff Greta Husserl boarded defendant Swiss
Air's direct flight from Zurich, Switzerland, to New York City. Shortly
after takeoff an Arab terrorist group, the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine, hijacked the plane' to a deserted airstrip near Amman, Jor-
dan, where the passengers were forced to remain aboard the aircraft for 24
hours "under circumstances less than ideal for physical or mental health."'
After several additional days of detention in the city of Amman, the
passengers were allowed to resume their journey, arriving in New York
City, their original destination, on September 13, 1970. A suit to recover
$75,000 for plaintiffs bodily injury and mental anguish allegedly caused
by the hijacking3 was commenced in the Supreme Court of New York, New
York County, and subsequently removed to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.4 Plaintiff proposed three
theories for recovery: application of the Warsaw Convention,5 as modified
by the Montreal Agreement;' negligence of the carrier before embarkation;
and breach of implied contractual duty.' Swiss Air moved for summary
' Four separate aircraft, with a total of over 600 passengers on board, were hijacked by the
Popular Front on the same day to underscore its political grievances against Israel and her
allies. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
I Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Judge
Tyler's sympathetic description of the uncontested facts involved must be viewed in light of
his "substantial doubt that plaintiff will be able to prove both injury and causation." Id.
(footnote omitted).
Neither the complaint nor plaintiff's deposition indicates that she was injured
by impact of any physical object on her body. But she does contend that the mental
trauma of the hijacking experience, apparently including to some extent the
detention in Amman and the trip back to Zurich, caused various mental and psy-
chosomatic injuries, at least some of which involve demonstrable, physiological
manifestations.
Id. (emphasis added).
I Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd 485 F.2d
1240 (2d Cir. 1973). The federal court has jurisdiction under diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1970).
1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, open for signature, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1935), T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11
(effective for United States Oct. 29, 1934) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. The
English text is also reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1502 note (1974).
' Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, [19711 2 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (effective for United States Oct. 14,
1971) [hereinafter cited as Montreal Agreement]. The Montreal Agreement, a combination
of treaty, contract, and administrative approval, is composed of four documents: (1) an
agreement, C.A.B. Agreement No. 18,900; (2) a tariff; (3) a notice to passengers; and (4) the
order of the C.A.B. approving the tariffs, C.A.B. Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302
(1966). The Agreement may also be found in L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 12A.03-
.06 (1971 ed.). See notes 12-14 infra and accompanying text.
I The Warsaw Convention does not provide a cause of action; it merely creates a presump-
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judgment on the ground that a hijacking was not an "accident" as required
under the Convention,' but the motion was denied.' Defendant subse-
quently sought summary judgment on the theory that the Warsaw Conven-
tion provided the exclusive relief available for an injury sustained in inter-
national air transportation, and its coverage did not include the mental
injury allegedly suffered by plaintiff. Held, motion denied. The Warsaw
Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, does comprehend,
and thus supplies the exclusive relief for, mental and psychosomatic inju-
ries. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
The drafters of the original Warsaw Convention had two major goals in
mind: uniformity in the procedure for dealing with claims arising out of
international air transportation and, more importantly, limitation of the
potential liability of the carrier for injury caused by accidents."° As the
airline industry developed, its need for financial protection diminished;
steadily mounting dissatisfaction with the low ceiling on compensation for
passenger injuries ultimately led the United States to present the Polish
Government with a formal Notice of Denunciation of the Convention to
become effective on May 15, 1966." The Notice was withdrawn, however,
one day prior to its effective date when an agreement was reached among
the majority of international ansd domestic carriers. The generally ac-
knowledged interim solution provided that the carrier parties both waived
the defense of due care 2 and raised the liability limitation to $75,000. 1 The
tion of liability if the applicable substantive law provides a claim for relief. Plaintiff's alter-
nate theories rely upon tort and contract causes of action that she asserts arose before embar-
kation, thus allegedly not covered by the Convention. See notes 31 and 32 infra and accompa-
nying text.
' Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention establishes that the carrier is liable "for damage
sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger, or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."
Warsaw Convention, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
I Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240
(2d Cir. 1973); see 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 481 (1974).
1* See Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-500 (1967).
1 Dep't State Press Release No. 268, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923 (1965). The position of the
United States was amplified by the assurance that the Notice of Denunciation would be
withdrawn if there was a reasonable chance for success of an international agreement estab-
lishing the liability limitation for international air transportation at a figure of $100,000 per
passenger or establishing uniform rules without any liability limitation, and if, pending the
effectiveness of any such international agreement, there was a provisional agreement among
the principal international airlines waiving the limits of liability up to $75,000 per passenger.
Id. at 924; see Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 551-52 (1967); Note, The 1966 Carrier Agreements: The United States
Retains the Warsaw Convention, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 140 (1966).
"1 Before the Montreal Agreement, supra note 6, an injury comprehended under article 17
raised a presumption of the carrier's liability which could be overcome by proof that the
carrier and its agents had taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
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provisions of this international intercarrier contract, known as the Mon-
treal Agreement, thus effectively imposed strict liability upon the carrier
in exchange for the continuation of a uniform limitation on compensatory
liability." Further efforts to amend the Warsaw Convention have been
unsuccessful.15
American courts have consistently applied the Warsaw Convention, its
amendments and agreements, but their experience with problems of con-
struction has been limited to selected articles of the Convention."5 Since
victims of hijackings rarely suffer the physical impact injuries found in
actual aircraft crashes, which are clearly compensable under the
Convention, the relatively recent appearance of hijackings 7 has been
accompanied by passenger lawsuits seeking recovery solely for mental an-
guish. After determining that hijacking falls within the coverage of the
impossible for them to take such measures. See generally Abramovsky, Compensation for
Passengers of Hijacked Aircraft, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 350-56 (1972).
"3 See Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REV. 497, 596-97 (1967). See also Note, The 1966 Carrier Agreements: The United
States Retains the Warsaw Convention, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 140 (1966).
' C.A.B. Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966); see note 6 supra.
's Continued United States dissatisfaction with the liability limitation precipitated an
effort to deal with the Warsaw Convention by formal amendment at Guatemala City in 1971.
Officially entitled "Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended
by the Protocol Done at The Hague on 28 September 1955," the Guatemala Protocol recog-
nized the strict liability principle in the Montreal Agreement, supra note 6, raised the liability,
limitation to $100,000 with automatic increases, and provided for several additional amend-
ments. Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to Further Amend the 1929 Warsaw
Convention, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 519 (1972); Mankiewicz, Warsaw Convention: The 1971
Protocol of Guatemala City, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 335 (1972). The inherent tendency of the
United States Senate to avoid further commitment to any liability limitation system has
delayed ratification of the protocol. A supplemental plan, allowed by the Protocol, is cur-
rently being considered. Boyle, The Warsaw Convention, 8 FORUM 268, 278 (1972).
" Compare: Grey v. American Airlines, 95 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (applicability of
Convention to domestic flights, art. 1) with Glenn v. Compania Cubama De Aviacion, S.A.,
102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952) (nationality of carrier, art. 1); Berner v. United Airlines,
Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 9, 157 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1956) (Convention securing jurisdiction, art. 1) with
Nudo v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 207 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (Convention
precluding jurisdiction, art. 1); Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122
(2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951) ("wilful misconduct" explained, art. 25) with
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Holland v. Turner, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Ross v. Pan
American Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949) (adequate delivery of ticket, art.
3) with Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
816 (1965) (inadequate ticket delivery); see Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508
(2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by equally divided Supreme Court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (ticket failed to
give notice of applicability of Convention's liability limitation, art. 3).
" From 1961 to November of 1972 there were 159 recorded hijackings of United States
planes alone. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1972, at 3, col. 1 (data reported by the Federal Aviation
Administration). "All but a handful of these cases have occurred since 1967, when hijacking
for pleasure, profit and political reasons first became a serious threat to air travellers."
Comment, Air Law-Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 555 (1973).
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Warsaw Convention, courts have been reluctant to find mental injuries as
being comprehended by article 17.10 While plaintiffs have been allowed to
recover for the bodily injuries that resulted from mental anguish and the
"emotional distress . . . directly precipitated by the bodily injury," 9 men-
tal harm has been uniformly held not compensable without precedent
physical contact during the hijacking.2" The New York Court of Appeals
avoided recognition of mental harm alone by holding as follows:
A claim for damages under article 17 [of the Warsaw Convention] arises
"in the event of . . . bodily injury." The claim must therefore be predi-
cated upon some objective identifiable injury to the body . . . .If the
accident-the hijacking-caused severe fright, which in turn manifested
itself in some objective "bodily injury," then we would conclude that the
Convention's requirement of the causal connection is satisfied. For exam-
ple, if plaintiff Herman's skin rash was caused or aggravated by the fright
she experienced on board the aircraft, then she should be compensated for
the rash and for the damages flowing from the rash. It follows that, if
proved at trial, she should be compensated for her mental anguish, suf-
fered as a result of the rash .... 1
In an earlier opinion overruling a motion to dismiss made in the same
court and case as that considered here, the court mentioned in passing that
the wording of article 17 did not appear to include recovery for mental
harm.22 Only one case before an American court, American Airlines v.
Ulen,2 contains any language that would seem to allow recovery for mental
harm alone, but its force is diminished by the fact that the relevant pas-
sage appears only in an unofficial report of the case. 24
In a carefully structured examination of the problems involved with
t" See note 8 supra; notes 19-23 infra and accompanying text. Recovery for mental and
emotional harm is in itself a new area of the law. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 54 (4th
ed. 1971).
" Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (D.N.M. 1973).
2 See, e.g., Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (D.N.M. 1973).
N.E.2d 848 (1974); Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973);
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240
(2d Cir. 1973).
23 Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 399; 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 109; 314
N.E.2d 848, 856 (1974) (emphasis added).
22 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485
F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
24 The following language does not appear in the reported opinion of the court cited above,
but is reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO), CASES ON THE WARSAW
CONVENTION (1929-1955), at 87, ICAO Doc. 36 (1955):
[The plaintiff] is entitled to recover such sum of money . . . [as] will fairly and
reasonably and adequately compensate her for the physical injuries, and the disa-
bilities which she sustained by reason of this accident, together with pain and
suffering and anguish which she has endured, as well as the mental and nervous
shock and any and all permanent injuries which you might find either physically
or to her mental and nervous system . ...
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recovery for mental harm under the Warsaw Convention, the court in
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.25 first examines the extent of the "ex-
clusive remedy" feature of the Warsaw Convention, 9 finding that the draf-
ters explicitly made the conditions and limits of the Convention "exclu-
sively applicable to certain actions for damages based on the enumerated
types of injury."" Judge Tyler acknowledges that article 17 is the provision
that deals with personal injuries other than those caused by the carrier's
delay and establishes the standard of liability. The official English trans-
lation 9 of article 17 reads as follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passen-
ger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking.3 0
These provisions are construed to mean that if the passenger's injury oc-
curs as described in article 17,1 any relief available, regardless of the
particular cause of action used to "found" 2 the claim, would be subject to
1' 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
26 Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, provides:
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph
shall also apply ...
The court points out that article 17 is the only provision that deals with personal injuries other
than delay. 388 F. Supp. at 1245.
2 388 F. Supp. at 1245.
1 To avoid confusion the drafters placed all delay injuries, whether to persons or property,
in a separate article. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 19.
2' The Warsaw Convention provides: "[tihis convention is drawn up in French in a single
copy .... Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 36. Thus the only official version of article
17 reads as follows:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenue en cas de mort, de blessure,
ou de toute autre l6sion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque l'accident qui a
cause le dommage s'est produit i bord de l'6eronefou au cours de toutes op6rations
d'embarquement et de d~barquement.
Id. art. 17 (emphasis added).
"0 Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art. 17 (official English translation) (emphasis
added). The English translation begins at 49 Stat. 3014 (1935).
21 The court construes "on board the aircraft" to include "all of the time between embarka-
tion at the origin of a flight and disembarkation at a scheduled destination of a flight." This
construction precludes any claim that since plaintiffs injuries were caused during the time
she was in Amman, they therefore would fall outside the provisions of article 17. 388 F. Supp.
at 1247.
32 The use of the phrase "however founded" in article 17 is seen to serve two purposes: (1)
"to accommodate all of the multifarious bases on which a claim might be founded, whether
under code law or common law, whether under contractor tort," and (2) "to include all bases
on which a claim seeking relief for an injury might be founded in any one country." 388 F.
Supp. at 1245.
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the conditions and limitations of the Warsaw Convention. Although the
court agrees with defendant that the Convention therefore provides the
exclusive relief for any of plaintiff Husserl's alternative "causes of action"
that are based on a type of injury comprehended by the Convention, 3 it
refuses to hold that a type of injury not within the coverage would be
denied recovery. Instead, Judge Tyler concludes, injuries not compre-
hended by the Warsaw Convention "may give rise to causes of action not
subject to any of the conditions or limits of the Warsaw system." 4
This leaves the problem of deciding whether mental harm, the particular
type of injury in question, falls within the strict but limited liability of the
Convention, or outside the provisions of article 17 and therefore subject to
none of the restrictions of the Warsaw Convention. In a specific analysis
of the problems of interpreting the original French text of the Convention,
3 5
the court in Husserl rejects the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that "[tihe
binding meaning of the terms [of the Warsaw Convention] is the French
legal meaning."3 Neither the. French legal meaning of the words nor the
French interpretation of the treaty is seen as binding;3 1 indeed, they are
both considered less important than the intention of the drafters, the un-
derstanding of the President and the Senate when they ratified and ad-
hered to the Convention, the subsequent behavior of the signatories, and
the construction most likely to effectuate the purposes of the Convention.38
The Warsaw Convention, Judge Tyler states, is now part of the federal law
and should be interpreted in light of that law. The French text is ignored
in the absence of any "convincing evidence that the French legal meaning
of the phrase would be at all elucidating.319 The English text, when divided
into component parts, is interpreted expansively; with reference to "bodily
injury," the mind is seen as part of the body, and mental reactions are
"merely more subtle and less well understood . . . . "I It is remarkable
"Any action, however, founded, seeking recovery for injuries comprehended by Article
17 and caused by an accident occurring in a place specified by Article 17 can be brought only
subject to the conditions and limits established by the Warsaw system." Id. at 1246 (emphasis
added).
4 Id. Such injuries would be sued on subject to the substantive law and procedures of the
forum without regard to the problems associated with article 17 and the ceiling on allowable
recovery, but also without the benefit of the Convention's strict liability. Judge Tyler at no
time gives an example of such an injury, but rather threatens the defendant with unlimited
liability if on appeal it should be determined that mental and psychosomatic injuries are not
comprehended by article 17.
1 See note 29 supra.
38 388 F. Supp. at 1248-49, citing its earlier agreement in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport
Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973), citing Block
v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 1967).
1, See notes 49-52 infra and accompanying text.
388 F. Supp. at 1249.
39 Id.
,0 Id. at 1250. The Husserl court examines the words "death," "wounding" and "bodily
injury" individually to conclude that the words "in English or in French can be construed to
relate to emotional and mental injury." Id. Viewed as an entire phrase, "death, wounding or
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that after listing the various factors which should have an effect on the
interpretation of the wording, the court dismisses them all as inconclu-
sive.4" With surprising candor, the court admits that the arguments and
approaches it discusses have not been very helpful other than to determine
the purpose and intent of the drafters, and to "integrate a new rule of law
with the relevant, pre-existing law."42
In the effort to determine the original intent of the treaty drafters, the
court in Husserl considers several contending possibilities: the framers
may merely have chosen inappropriate words to effect their intent; they
may have intended to exclude all injuries for which the Convention did not
provide; or, they may have thought that they had included all the injuries
for which there were remedies at law.43 Rather than assigning mental and
psychosomatic injuries to the "unfortunate vacuum" of neglected inju-
ries," Judge Tyler chooses to find them embraced by the phrase "death or
wounding . . . or any other bodily injury" contained in article 17:
[it is logical to infer that the drafters either believed that the phrase at
issue comprehended all personal injuries involving the organic functioning
of a human being or neglected to consider injuries not comprehended by
the phrase. If they intended the former, Article 17 should be interpreted
to comprehend mental and psychosomatic injuries. If they had no specific
intention, Article 17 should be interpreted in the manner most likely to
effect the purposes of the Convention."3
The Husserl decision thus effectively creates a new rule of law by finding
that mental and psychosomatic injuries are "colorably within the ambit"
of the enumerated types based upon purpose and intent rather than
specific wording of the Warsaw Convention.
other bodily injury" seems to exclude mental harm, since it does not qualify as another form
of bodily injury. This problem may also be avoided by omitting the word "other" from the
translation of the French text, a technique employed by an article repeatedly cited by the
Husserl court: Lowenfeld, Hijacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic Trauma, 1 SYR.
J. INT'L L. & COM. 345, 348 (1973).
11 Also discarded as useless are: the marginal note "personal injuries" for article 17 in the
original English translation of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 5; passenger ticket limita-
tion of liability in "death and personal injuries," 351 F. Supp. at 708; and the substitution
of "personal injuries" in article 17 of the Guatemala Protocol. Abramovsky, Compensation
for Passengers of Hijacked Aircraft, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 356-57 (1972). See generally Man-
kiewicz, Warsaw Convention: The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 335,
337 (1972); 8 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 87 (1975).
4 388 F. Supp. at 1249.
'3 All available evidence indicates that the participants at the Warsaw conferences and the
Montreal Agreement discussions actually never thought of the possibility of suit for mental
and emotional harm. See Lowenfeld, Hijacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic
Trauma, 1 SYR. J. INT'L L. COM. 345, 347-48 (1972); 8 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 87, 105 (1975).
" The court expresses the belief that the purpose of the Convention "could more appropri-
ately be effected by construing the types of injury enumerated expansively to comprehend
as many types of injury as possible for which there is normally legal redress," 388 F. Supp.
at 1247 (footnote omitted).
'1 Id. at 1248.
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Since the Convention does not create a cause of action,4" a plaintiff must
allege a legal theory which would allow him to recover for the injuries
alleged. The court notes that, sitting as a federal court in New York, it is
probable that at trial it will apply New York substantive law. Under New
York law a cause of action for such injuries is recognized.47 Thus, the only
barriers remaining to recovery are the requirements that the plaintiff prove
causation and actual injury.
Using the Husserl reasoning, a hijacking victim may recover for mental
and psychosomatic injuries only in those states which recognize a cause of
action for this type of injury, a qualification which greatly narrows the
impact of the holding. The decision to include mental and emotional harm
without an impact requirement within the coverage of the Warsaw Con-
vention seems in line with the general growth of the law and the expanding
protection afforded airline passengers. 8 Yet the method used by Judge
Tyler is offensive to international law, 9 which suggests the use of either of
two approaches to the interpretation of treaties. The "textual" school
would concentrate upon the document in question and the ordinary mean-
ing of the words used,58 while the "contextualists" seek to determine the
intent of the parties from the treaty itself and the other available materi-
als.5 Instead of placing primary emphasis on the official text of the War-
saw Convention as required under either approach, the Husserl court looks
" Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907
(1957); Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd
on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied 348 U.S. 820 (1954).
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
" See Preston v. Hunting Air Transport Ltd., 1 Q.B. 454 (1956)(infant plaintiffs awarded
damages for loss of the care of their mother); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 1971);
36 Mo. L. REV. 303, 305 (1973) (speculation that English courts would also allow recovery
for emotional shock).
1' Reliance upon the English translation may well lead to interpretations contrary to the
text of the official version; despite Judge Tyler's assurances that the French text is not
controlling, it is controlling between signatories to the treaty under international law. Todok
v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449, 454 (1929). Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provides that "[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
open for signature May 23, 1969, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES,
OFFICIAL RECORDS 289, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Vienna
Convention]. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 140 (1965) clearly agrees:
The duty of a state to give effect to the terms of an international agreement to which
it is a party. . . is not affected by a provision of its domestic law that is in conflict
with the agreement or by the absence of domestic law necessary for it to give effect
to the terms of the agreement.
See also id. § 147 for a list of criteria to be used for interpretation.
" A textual approach, with some modification, is used in the Vienna Convention, supra
note 49. The Vienna Convention may also be found in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 679 (1969).
" The contextualists also put primary reliance upon the text, but allow the admission of
evidence of all kinds. For a short, informative description of the different schools see 8
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 87, 92-97 (1975).
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to the unofficial English translation as controlling federal statutory law;
the criteria for interpreting an international convention, however, are the
same whether the treaty is self-executing or enacted into domestic law by
legislative approval.2
In an effort to speed the resolution of plaintiff Husserl's claim, Judge
Tyler relied upon his own understanding of the purpose of the Warsaw
Convention rather than the meaning of the original text, a method which
is less likely to compel the concurrence of other courts. Far from disposing
of the question of application of the Convention, Husserl invites future
conflicting opinions based upon the official French text or even on another
interpretation of the English translation. The decision thus detracts from
the uniformity of application of the Convention, and, ultimately, its use-
fulness to both the air carriers and the victims of hijackings.
Lee Carter Mundell
52 Under the law of the United States, the rules stated in §§ 146 and 147 [criteria
for interpretation of internationsl agreements] are applicable to the interpretation
by a court of an international agreement for the purpose of determining its effect
as domestic law ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 151 (1965).
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